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Abstract 
 Judge Leventhal famously described the invocation of legislative history as “the 
equivalent of entering a crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads of the guests for 
one’s friends. The volume of legislative history is so great and varied, some contend, that judges 
cite it selectively to advance their policy agendas. In this article, we employ positive political and 
contextual theories of judicial behavior to examine how judges use legislative history.  We 
consider whether opinion-writing judges, as Judge Leventhal might suggest, cite legislative 
history from legislators who share the same political-ideological perspective as the opinion 
writing judge?   Or do judges make such choices in a broader context than Judge Leventhal’s 
statement suggests.  We posit that an opinion writing judge would cite legislative statements 
supporting an outcome preferred by the opinion-writing judge, when such statements come from 
legislators who share the same political-ideological perspective as the opinion-writing judge’s 
colleagues or superiors.  This should be so regardless of whether the cited legislator shares the 
broader perspectives of the opinion-writing judge himself.  Put in Leventhal’s terms, instead of 
looking for their own ideological friends, judges look over the heads of the guests for the 
legislative friends of the judge’s colleagues on the bench (or superiors on higher benches).  We 
test this approach with citation data gathered from judicial opinions and find evidence of 
hierarchy (high court oversight) and panel (co-members on a court) effects in citation to 
legislative history, effects that appear related to the political-ideological identification of judges 
who review or are co-members on a panel of the authoring judge. Specifically, we find that the 
higher the proportion of Republicans in the reviewing court or sitting on the same three-judge 
panel, the higher the proportion of legislative history cites that will be to Republican legislators, 
independent of the political orientation of the authoring judge. 
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Judicial Citation to Legislative History:  
Contextual Theory and Empirical Analysis 
 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 Judge Leventhal famously described the invocation of legislative history as “the 
equivalent of entering a crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads of the guests for 
one’s friends” (Wald 1983, quoting Judge Leventhal).  The volume of legislative history is so 
great and varied, some contend, that judges could cite it selectively to advance their policy 
agendas (Scalia 1997).  It may be, however, that judges make such choices in a broader context 
than Judge Leventhal’s statement suggests.  Perhaps instead of looking for their own ideological 
friends, judges look over the heads of the guests for the ideological friends of their colleagues.. 
In other words, instead of merely citing legislative history statements consistent with their own 
case preferences, judges may tend to cite legislative history from legislators who share the broad 
perspectives of the judges whom an opinion-writing judge must persuade.. For example, a 
Democrat-appointed opinion writing judge who sits on a panel with two Republican-appointed 
judges, or who is a district judge in a circuit in which most of the circuit judges were 
Republican-appointed, may search out legislative statements made by Republican legislators 
supporting the preferred case outcome of the opinion-writing judge.   
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 The judicial politics literature has shown that judicial attitudes are powerful predictors of 
judges’ votes and thus of case outcomes. (Pinnello 1999) The literature has generally assessed 
whether judicial attitudes and case facts predict case outcomes (e.g., Segal and Spaeth 1993), 
rather than addressing the traditional interest of law professors, the reasoning underlying judicial 
decisions. This Article offers a quantitative analysis of the reasoning proffered for decisions by 
considering whether opinion content—cites to legislative history—varies based on the political 
characteristics of the opinion audience (other judges), controlling for the opinion author’s own 
political-ideological orientation. Specifically, we ask whether judges select legislative history 
that is particularly likely to appeal to those who may have some power to determine whether the 
judges’ preferred resolutions of issues can become law, such as co-members of a judicial panel 
or judges on a higher court who might hear the case on appeal. Such tailoring would indicate not 
only that judges genuinely believe in the power of legal argument to persuade, but also that 
judges recognize that some arguments might be more persuasive to, and more constraining for, 
some judges than for others. 
Determination of whether judges tailor their opinions based on political-ideological 
context demands identification of some aspect of judicial reasoning that can serve as an easily 
measurable proxy for whether an opinion is likely to appeal to other jurists.  We chose to analyze 
citations to legislative history in judicial opinions because legislative history is generated by a 
highly partisan and political group of policy makers, making it easy to identify the political-
ideological signal a citation might represent to judges. We assess whether opinion-writing judges 
are more likely to cite to legislative history created by Democratic than Republican legislators 
when the judicial audience consists of mainly Democrat rather than Republican appointed 
judges, and vice-versa. Selective citation may occur because opinion authors expect other judges 
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to take more seriously the legislative statements of those with whom they are generally inclined 
to identify with politically, or because same-party legislators are more inclined to make 
statements that a judge would find persuasive.  
In considering this thesis, we address several questions. First, to what extent does the 
opinion writing judge’s own political ideology affect which legislative history the judge cites? 
Although this question is somewhat apart from our inquiry, it is independently important because 
it addresses whether a judge’s ideology affects only how the judge votes, or also how the judge 
argues. Also, it will be important to control for a judge’s own ideology in seeking to identify 
tailoring of opinions to the ideology of others. Second, to what extent is there a “hierarchy 
effect” on a judge’s use of legislative history?  In particular, to what extent, if any, does the 
political orientation of a higher court (federal circuit court) affect the citation of legislative 
history by a lower court (federal district court) within the higher court’s jurisdiction?  Third, to 
what extent is there a “panel effect”? In particular, on a multimember judicial panel (federal 
three-judge appellate panel), to what extent is a circuit judge’s citation to legislative history 
influenced by the characteristics of the other judges on that court?  For each of these questions, 
we will develop a model predicting the probability that any particular cite to legislative history is 
a cite to a legislator of a particular political party. 
 In Part II of this article, we briefly review various models of judicial decisionmaking 
offered by legal theorists and judicial politics scholars and assess their implications for citations 
to legislative history. We first briefly note that critics of legislative history have suggested that 
judges cite legislative history selectively to bolster their preferred issue resolutions. Evidence of 
selective citation would provide some ammunition to those critics, though it would be 
insufficient to resolve the underlying normative questions about whether legislative history 
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should be relied upon at all, and if so which legislative history to use.  We then focus on the 
implications of the political science literature for legislative history.  The leading theory from 
political science – the attitudinal theory -- does not offer strong predictions about legislative 
history because the theory explains voting outcomes rather than the reasons judges may give for 
their votes.  
Recently, though, the literature in law and positive political theory has recognized that a 
judge’s voting behavior may depend on political context, such as the ideology of other judges on 
the bench or in appellate review capacity. For example, judges may tend to reach more liberal 
results if the other members of a judicial panel are Democrat appointees than if they are 
Republican appointees. Such results, however, need not indicate persuasion; they may indicate 
only that judges defer for collegial reasons or to avoid the embarrassment of a dissent. Indeed, 
some recent work in this literature has suggested that these contextual effects are not the results 
of actual persuasion by judges of one another. Much of that literature, however, has focused on 
judges’ votes rather than on the content of their opinions. Our project, by contrast, seeks 
evidence of attempts at persuasion by examining the opinions themselves.  
In Part III, we present our empirical analysis. The evidence suggests that political context 
does help to predict the invocation of legislative history by federal judges. Specifically, although 
we find little evidence that a judge’s own putative ideology affects whether the judge is more 
likely than the average judge to cite Republican or Democratic legislators, we find statistically 
significant evidence of hierarchy and panel contextual effects on an opinion writing judge’s 
decision of what legislative history to cite. 
Part IV provides discussion, considering possible interpretations of the data and 
implications of the data both for debates on judicial behavior and for debates on the use of 
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legislative history.  The most significant alternative explanation for our findings is that the 
identity of other judges directly affects how a particular judge votes, and legislative history in 
turn reflects the judge’s decision on the merits. Although this may be part of the story, we 
suggest that it is unlikely to provide a complete explanation of our findings, because such a 
theory would indicate that a judge’s own political orientation should also significantly predict 
citation patterns. We conclude in Part V with suggestions for further exploration. 
 
II. Theoretical Background 
This part situates the empirical project in the context of debates among legal scholars 
concerning legislative history and among political scientists seeking to explain judicial 
decisionmaking. Part II.A notes arguments that legislative history is so voluminous that judges 
may cite it selectively to advance their political agendas. Legal theorists, however, have not 
assessed or predicted whether selective citation would vary based on the identity of other judges. 
Parts II.B and II.C, meanwhile, demonstrate that the attitudinal model and the strategic model of 
judicial decisionmaking do not offer firm predictions about whether selective citation exists. A 
recent literature on contextual effects has clearly demonstrated that the characteristics of judges 
on a panel affect the votes of other judges on the panel. That literature, however, has not so far 
demonstrated that these effects are the result of persuasion, and indeed some studies suggest the 
contrary.  
A. Legal Theory and Selective Citation 
The possibility that judges might selectively choose arguments is a familiar one, 
particularly in the context of legislative history. As mentioned above, Judge Leventhal described 
the invocation of legislative history as “the equivalent of entering a crowded cocktail party and 
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looking over the heads of the guests for one’s friends” (Wald 1983, quoting Judge Leventhal). 
Similarly, Justice Scalia argues that legislative history provides “something for everyone” and it 
can be “relied upon or dismissed with equal plausibility” and facilitates decisions “based upon 
the courts’ own policy preferences” (Scalia 1997, pp. 35-37).  Because there may be legislative 
history on both sides of an issue, consideration of legislative history might enable a judge to 
support either side, perhaps even when the text of the statute points unambiguously in only one 
direction. 
An implication of the Leventhal and Scalia views is that judges should be more likely to 
cite legislative history approvingly when the legislative history advances the judge’s personal 
policy preferences. Identification of selective citation would thus provide some support for 
Scalia’s normative argument that judges should not rely on legislative history. It would not 
resolve the dispute altogether, however.  The ultimate question is the degree of selective citation 
and constraints inherent in legislative history, relative to other legal sources.  
B. Political Science and Selective Citation 
The dominant view of judicial decisionmaking in the political science literature—the 
attitudinal model—holds that that the political beliefs and attitudes of judges measurably affect 
their voting choices. (Segal and Spaeth 1993) The studies supporting this view are now legion 
(Pinello 1999), seriously undercutting at least the strong version of the legal model. The 
empirical research also shows that a judge’s political party affiliation, as represented by the party 
of the appointing president, is a good proxy for ideological or attitudinal differences that impact 
the judge’s voting in cases (Pinello 1999). 
 The attitudinal model makes predictions about the outcomes of cases, not about the 
content of opinions. The attitudinal model thus does not produce clear testable predictions about 
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citations to legislative history. At least stated in a strong form, the model would appear to deny 
that legislative history in fact motivates judicial decisionmaking. Attitudinal theory, however, 
would be consistent with findings of ideological influences on legislative history citation. 
Perhaps such citation is merely a form of post hoc rationalization, in which case the attitudinal 
model might predict that judges would tend to cite legislative history consistent with their policy 
preferences.   
In recent years, law and positive political theory scholarship has begun looking beyond 
case outcomes to consider some aspects of the reasoning underlying decisions, showing how 
some choices may reflect strategic attempts to affect policy. Tiller and Spiller (1999), for 
example, posited that a judge’s choice between relying on factual and legal grounds to resolve a 
case can serve to protect the judge’s policy choice preferences. Smith and Tiller (2002) found 
empirical support for that theory by considering environmental cases. They found that judges 
would choose fact-based rationales for the decisions they cared about most to insulate those 
decisions from higher court review and reversal. Specifically, liberal judges were more likely to 
use fact-based rationales when reversing EPA decisions for being too lax (outcomes those judges 
wanted to stick) than when reversing the EPA for being too strict. Conservative judges, on the 
other hand, were more likely to use fact-based rationales when reversing EPA decisions for 
being too strict (outcomes those judges would want to stick) than when reversing the EPA for 
being too lax.1   
This literature has thus identified a strategic dimension to opinion reasoning, but only 
when the choice of reasoning has clear legal implications. The literature has not yet explained 
more micro-level aspects of opinion reasoning, such as why an opinion emphasizes certain facts 
or cases rather than others. Given a particular final case outcome, there is no immediate legal 
                                                 
1
 Richard L. Revesz, Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 Va. L. Rev. 1717 (1997). 
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consequence to whether a judge supported that outcome by citing to legislative history created by 
a legislator of one party or the other, or by not citing to legislative history at all. Citation of 
legislative history thus could have a strategic dimension only if such citation affected the 
probability that a judge’s preferred case outcome in fact becomes the selected final outcome. 
This possibility finds some support in the recent development of a contextual effects 
model which demonstrates that the characteristics of judges affect the decisions of other judges 
deciding cases with them. Cross and Tiller (1998), for example, show that a judge writing an 
opinion for a three-judge panel is less likely to vote against legal precedent and in accordance 
with the judge’s presumed ideological preferences, as measured by the political party of the 
President who appointed the judge, when there is at least one remaining judge on the panel who 
does not share the judge’s presumed preferences. This third judge acts as a potential 
“whistleblower” who induces the opinion author to “follow the law.” 
Sunstein et al. (2004) have found related interaction effects in a range of doctrinal 
settings, though not in some others. On cases concerning issues such as affirmative action, 
piercing the corporate veil, and environmental regulation, they found that while the party of the 
appointing president is “a fairly good predictor of how individual judges will vote, … the 
political party of the president who appointed the other two judges on the panel is at least as 
good a predictor of how individual judges will vote.” (p. 305) As Sunstein et al. note, however, 
there are multiple possible explanations for the interaction effects: “Our data do not reveal 
whether ideological dampening is a product of persuasion or a form of collegiality.” (p. 305) 
Identification of contextual effects by itself is thus insufficient to establish the 
decisionmaking dynamics underlying those effects or to establish that judges genuinely persuade 
one another. Cameron and Cummings (2003) attempted to explore the underlying dynamics by 
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disaggregating what they label “peer effects,” where one judge’s votes affect another’s, from 
“diversity effects,” where one judge’s characteristics (the ability to persuade through argument, 
for example) affect another judge’s votes. To disaggregate the diversity and peer effects from 
each other and from the effect of a judge’s own ideology on the judge’s decisionmaking, 
Cameron and Cummings studied the effect of racial, gender and ideological diversity on judicial 
decisionmaking in affirmative action cases. Their analysis attributed the contextual effects 
entirely to the peer effect rather than to the diversity effect. 
A separate study, Farhang and Wawro (2004), identified similar contextual effects to 
those found by Cameron and Cummings in the context of discrimination cases. They showed that 
the presence of a single woman on a judicial panel had a significant effect on the votes of the 
other panel members. They also attributed the result to a peer effect rather than to a diversity 
effect. Whether a female judge wrote the opinion did not have a statistically significant effect on 
the votes of either that judge or of the other judges. Thus, they conclude, the contextual effect 
does not occur as a result of the other judges’ being persuaded by the opinion author in 
particular.  
The findings that no diversity effect exists may hold strongly for the most political areas 
of the law.  Most judges may be sufficiently familiar with the central arguments concerning 
affirmative action (the Cameron and Cummings study) and gender discrimination (the Farhang 
and Wawro study) that others are unlikely to persuade them to change their initial positions. The 
contextual effects studies have focused on data concerning judges’ votes in cases presumably 
because of the availability of such data. Judges are engaged in a deliberative enterprise, however, 
so contextual effects also may occur at the level beneath judges’ votes, in the micro-level legal 
reasoning that judges use to support the resolutions that they reach. If the diversity effect exists 
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and leads judges to attempt to persuade one another, then we might expect judges seeking to 
persuade other judges to adopt reasoning tailored to those judges’ political orientations. Our 
study considers this possibility. 
 
III. Empirical Analysis 
 We theorize that the judicial-political context confronting a particular judge may be 
associated with particular patterns of citations to legislative history. In Part III.A, we define three 
testable implications of our model. Part III.B describes the data that we use to conduct our 
empirical analysis, and Part III.C reports the results. Part IV will assess the implications of the 
results. 
A. Testable implications 
 We offer three hypotheses, detailed below. Although our theoretical model suggests that 
these effects may be causal—for example, that judges cite to legislators of a particular party 
because the judges wish to influence higher-ranking judges of the same party—our empirical 
model tests only whether associations exist. We will discuss alternatives to the causal 
explanation in Part IV. 
 First, we hypothesize the existence of a political-ideology effect for the opinion-writing 
judge. That is, when an authoring judge, whether on a district or appellate court, cites to 
legislative history, the judge is more likely to cite a Republican legislator if the judge was 
appointed by a Republican president (and similar for Democrat appointed judges and Democrat 
legislators). This is the most tentative hypothesis and it is not a direct prediction of the contextual 
effects model;  it is only a possible implication of the attitudinal model as it looks solely to the 
authoring judge’s own political ideology. We further predict that the ideology effect is most 
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likely to be pronounced in concurring and dissenting opinions on circuit court panels, where the 
judge is disagreeing with an opinion the majority has endorsed.  In those situations, a judge has 
failed, and perhaps not even attempted, to persuade other judges on the panel. 
 Second, we hypothesize the existence of a hierarchy effect. That is, a judge’s pattern of 
citation to legislative history is likely to be correlated with the identities of judges who may 
review the judge’s work. In particular, we predict that when a district judge cites to legislative 
history, the probability that the citation is to a Republican legislator will be greater, the larger the 
proportion of Republican-appointed judges on the reviewing court, regardless of the political 
ideology of the opinion-writing judge herself.2 .  
 Third, we hypothesize the existence of a panel effect. That is, a judge’s pattern of citation 
to legislative history is likely to be correlated with the identities of the other judges on the panel. 
In particular, we predict that when an appellate judge cites to legislative history, the probability 
that the citation is to a Republican legislator will be greater, the larger the proportion of 
Republican-appointed judges on that panel. This prediction applies to all circuit court panels, 
including three-judge panels and en banc panels. 
B. Data 
 Our data derive from the LEXIS® database of decisions by federal courts in the United 
States. We downloaded all cases decided from 1950 through 2003 that contained the phrase 
“Cong. Rec.”, the appropriate citation form for the Congressional Record. Our analysis is thus 
only to this form of legislative history, not to other forms, such as committee reports.3  The 
dataset including data identifying for each opinion the court issuing the opinion, the judge 
                                                 
2
 We will test the hierarchy effect only on district court decisions because the rarity of changes in the composition of 
the Supreme Court makes it difficult to identify associations between Supreme Court composition and lower court 
decisionmaking. 
3
 A computer program developed in Visual Basic for Applications parsed the downloaded cases, and a macro in the 
SAS statistical programming language accomplished further processing.  
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authoring the opinion (or the first listed judge in the case of jointly authored opinions), the 
number of citations to legislative history, and the proportion of legislative history citations that 
were to Republican legislators. Cases in which we were unable to determine the identity of all 
judges on the panel were excluded from the database.4  
Data identifying the President appointing a particular judge was drawn from the Federal 
Judges Biographical Database.  That source was also used to calculate, for each district court 
and Court of Appeals case, the proportion of Republican judges on the Court of Appeals at the 
end of the year in which the case was decided.  We assigned particular legislators to particular 
citations by examining parentheticals following citations, which often contained text such as 
“remarks of Rep. Smith.”5  In the absence of such an identification, we searched in the 1000 
characters preceding the citation for an identification of a legislator (either a member of the 
House or of the Senate). Though this approach may admit occasional errors, we have no reason 
to believe that these errors would bias our results. Where no legislator could be identified, either 
because there was no reference to a legislator or a reference did not uniquely identify a legislator 
in the relevant session of Congress, the citation was ignored. Cases with no citations successfully 
processed were omitted from the dataset. 
The result of the processing was a dataset consisting of data covering 6,524 opinions, 
comprising in total 13,074 citations to legislative history. To analyze the data, we ran probit 
regressions on the dataset, treating each citation as a unique observation. Because of the 
possibility of correlation among citations to legislative history in any given case, we clustered 
the regressions by case to obtain robust standard error estimates. 
                                                 
4
 For example when the wording identifying the judges was nonstandard or a judge’s name was misspelled, the 
computer program sometimes was unable to make a certain identification.  Such cases were excluded from the 
dataset. 
5
 The computer program looked up individual legislators by consulting McKibbin (1997). 
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 C. Results 
  1. Ideology Effect of Authoring Judge 
Our analysis of the ideology effect counts all citations to legislators by judges, broken 
down by the political affiliation of the citing judge (JD for Democrat-appointed judge, JR for 
Republican-appointed judge) and the political affiliation of the legislator cited (LD for Democrat 
or independent legislators, LR for Republican legislators).  We classified an opinion as a majority 
opinion if it was the first opinion in a case; all other opinions (concurrences and dissents) were 
classified as nonmajority opinions. Our first analysis includes decisions by all courts, including 
federal district courts (all of whose opinions are necessarily majority opinions), the federal U.S. 
Courts of Appeals, and the U.S. Supreme Court. We conducted a probit analysis combining all of 
the cases for (1) all the data, (2) for majority opinions only, and (3) for nonmajority opinions 
only, as summarized in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Probit Analysis on Opinion Author’s Party Affiliation 
 
 All opinions Majority opinions Nonmajority 
opinions 
 
Estimate 
(R.S.E.) 
Pr > 
ChiSq 
Estimate 
(R.S.E.) 
Pr > 
ChiSq 
Estimate 
(R.S.E.) 
Pr > 
ChiSq 
Intercept -0.2765 <0.0001** -0.2685 (0.0217) <0.0001** 
-0.3347 
(0.0681) <0.0001** 
JR 
0.0384 
(0.0295) 0.1932 
0.0172 
(0.0310) 0.5796 
0.1816 
(0.0878) 0.0387* 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01 
 
 
 Table 1 illustrates that while the ideology effect is at all times in the expected direction, 
the effect is not statistically significant for all opinions or for majority opinions. Consistent with 
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the prediction that a judge’s ideology is most likely to manifest itself when the judge disagrees 
with majority sentiment, the effect is statistically significant (p < 0.05) for the subset of 
nonmajority opinions.  
2. Hierarchy Effect 
 We next consider potential judicial hierarchy effects.  We consider overall citations by 
district court judges based upon their own party affiliation as well as the party affiliation of the 
reviewing circuit court (the hierarchy relationship). Table 2, presents our probit analysis.  
 
 
Table 2: Probit Analysis on Judicial Hierarchy 
 
 
Estimate 
(R.S.E.) Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept -0.4299 (0.0892) < 0.0001** 
JR 
0.0211 
(0.0554) 0.7030 
% JR on 
Circuit 
0.3330 
(0.1497) 0.0261* 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01 
 
 
We find that a judge’s own political ideology is not significant in deciding what type of 
legislator will be cited. The political ideology of the overseeing circuit is statistically significant 
(p < .05), however, and the effect is in the expected direction for the hierarchy effects hypothesis.  
3.  Panel Effects 
 Finally, we consider panel effects in decisions of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, while 
continuing to control for both ideology effects and, given the possibility of en banc review, 
hierarchy effects. We consider all citations to legislators by circuit court judges sitting in three-
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judge panels. Table 3 presents the results of our probit analysis, with independent variables 
representing the political affiliation of the opinion author, the political affiliation of the 
remaining judges on the three-judge panel, and the political affiliation of the remainder of the 
circuit.6 
 
Table 3: Probit Analysis on Panel Effects  
(All Circuit Court Three-Judge Panel Opinions) 
 
 
Estimate 
(R.S.E.) Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept -0.3809 (0.0594) <0. 0001** 
JR 
0.0133 
(0.0408) 0.7441 
% JR on 
rest of 
panel 
0.1165 
(0.0561) 0.0378* 
% JR on 
circuit 
0.0500 
(0.0830) 0.5470 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01 
 
 
The table shows that as the rest of the panel shifts from Democrat appointees to 
Republican, the opinion writing judge employs relatively more cites to Republican legislators.  
This is so whether the opinion author is a Democrat- or Republican-appointed judge. The probit 
analysis reveals that the variable representing the proportion of Republicans on the rest of the 
panel is statistically significant (p<0.05), once again in the expected direction. The variable 
                                                 
6
 We calculated this by subtracting the number of Democrats and Republicans on the panel from the number of 
Democrats and Republicans in the circuit as a whole. In some cases, the variable representing the proportion of 
judges in the rest of the circuit may be slightly inaccurate, for example when there are visiting judges on a three-
judge panel, but there is no reason to believe that this should bias our results. 
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representing the proportion of Republicans on the circuit as a whole is not statistically 
significant, however. This should not be surprising. Although in theory the circuit as a whole 
may review a panel decision en banc, such review is not mandatory and, for a variety of 
jurisprudiential and decision cost reasons, rarely occurs. (George 1999). Thus, in the vast 
majority of cases, the only judges that an authoring circuit panel judge likely will need to 
persuade are the other judges on the panel. 
To assess robustness, we also ran a probit regression involving all circuit court cases, 
including en banc cases.7 The variable representing the percentage of Republicans on the 
remainder of the panel continued to have the expected sign and to be statistically significant (p < 
0.05). The variable representing the ideology of the opinion author remained statistically 
insignificant.  
We also ran both of these probit regressions over subsets of the cases, isolating majority 
and nonmajority opinions. See Table 4 below.  For majority opinions, the panel effect is 
statistically significant (p < 0.01), while the opinion writer’s individual ideology is not.  For 
nonmajority opinions, the ideology effect is statistically significant (p < 0.05), but the panel 
effect is not. These conclusions are consistent with the contextual hypotheses advanced above. 
The ideology effect is most likely to be manifest when a judge has adopted a position that a 
majority of a panel has rejected, as reflected in the fact of a concurring or dissenting opinion. 
The panel effect, meanwhile, appears most likely to manifest itself in majority opinions, where 
persuasion remains important. An author of a nonmajority opinion may be much less concerned 
about persuading other judges because attempts at persuasion have already failed, at least by the 
                                                 
7
 The variable representing the percentage of Republicans in the remainder of the circuit was omitted for this 
regression because this variable was undefined for en banc cases. 
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time such an opinion is published. By contrast, the author of a majority opinion must guard 
against the possibility of losing votes. 
 
Table 4: Probit Analysis on Panel Effects 
(All Circuit Court Three-Judge Panel Opinions) 
 
 
Majority 
Opinions 
Nonmajority  
Opinions 
 
Estimate 
(R.S.E.) Pr > ChiSq 
Estimate 
(R.S.E.) Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept -0.3674 (0.0478) <0.0001** 
-0.4879 
(0.2067) 0.0182* 
JR 
-0.0227 
(0.0429) 0.5967 
0.2687 
(0.0.116) 0.0406* 
% JR on 
rest of 
panel 
0.1570 
(0.0587) 0.0075** 
-0.0910 
(0.1838) 0.6206 
% JR on 
circuit 
0.0367 
(0.0861) 0.6699 
0.0596 
(0.2677) 0.8237 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01 
 
 
We also ran separate regressions to assess whether there were interaction effects between 
the opinion author variable and the other variables, but no statistically significant associations 
were identified. In addition, we ran regressions to analyze specific subject matter areas, as 
determined by the presence of particular words and phrases in judicial opinions, but we did not 
find statistically significant results in any subgroups of cases.8   
 
IV. Discussion 
 
                                                 
8
 We ran regressions analyzing only Supreme Court cases, but again there were no statistically significant 
associations. 
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 The above data support the existence of the hierarchy effect and the panel effect, 
particularly in majority opinions.  Put differently, opinion writing judges – whether at the district 
or circuit level – are more likely to ignore their own political-ideological biases in citing 
legislative history and, instead, consider the makeup of the other judges who will review or be 
part of the decision making process.  For district court judges, that means looking to the makeup 
of the circuit court; for circuit court judges, that means looking to the makeup of the other 
members on the panel.   
 With respect to causality, that is whether the hierarchy and panel effects exist because 
opinion authors seek to persuade others of their views and tailor their opinions accordingly, we 
believe that the data appear more consistent with the persuasion explanation (the diversity effect, 
in the jargon discussed in Part II) than with the alternative explanation that judges influence one 
another only through their expected votes (the peer effect). To explain our interpretations, we 
first discuss the reasons that selective citation might occur, and we then assess the extent to 
which our data is consistent with these reasons.9 
A. Theories of Selective Citation 
 The above analysis reveals that judges are more likely to cite legislative history created 
by legislators of a particular party, the greater the number of other judges on the panel appointed 
by Presidents of that party. To assess these results, we must consider possible reasons that judges 
might selectively cite legislative history. We do not here consider reasons that judges might cite 
legislative history in general. Presumably, judges may cite legislative history because they 
                                                 
9
 As indicated above, we do not believe that our results are particularly useful for resolving normative debates about 
the use of legislative history in legal opinions. That we have found some evidence of selective citation supports 
claims that legislative history is at least somewhat manipulable, but debates on legislative history turn on how 
manipulable legislative history is. Our political variables are very rough proxies for the content of legislative history, 
and so we cannot conclude that we have found either a high level or a low level of selective citation. Moreover, 
because our analysis does not consider other forms of legal argument, we can offer no conclusion about the relative 
manipulability of legislative history. 
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believe that legislative history helps clarify congressional intent. At times, judges also cite 
legislative history simply to make the point that the legislative history does not clarify 
congressional intent. We have not formally categorized each citation with respect to the role that 
the citation plays in the opinion’s argument, but casual analysis of randomly selected cases 
suggests that courts, particularly below the level of the Supreme Court, cite legislative history far 
more often because they claim it is indeed relevant than because they wish to refute arguments or 
relevance. Our interest here is only in reasons that citation might be selective, with more cites to 
Democrats or to Republicans depending on the judge’s ideology or context. 
 Results-oriented selective citation. Selective citation might occur because judges would 
like to reach particular results in particular cases. For example, some judges, more likely 
Democrats than Republicans, might prefer a liberal interpretation to a conservative interpretation 
of a statute. The floor comments of Democrats may be more likely on average than the 
comments of Republicans to support such an interpretation. If this is so, and if Democrat-
appointed judges are more likely than Republican-appointed judges to reach liberal results, then 
selective citation is simply a byproduct of results-oriented voting. On this theory, the selective 
citation evidence in the hierarchy effect and panel effect occurs solely because the characteristics 
of other judges affect the vote of the opinion author. Selective citation thus occurs not because 
legislative history has genuine persuasive force, but because it follows naturally from a case 
outcome that is chosen. 
 Content-based selective citation. Selective citation also might occur because some judges 
may be more persuaded by some kinds of arguments than others. For example, judges may tend 
to find more significance in floor comments by members of Congress when those floor 
comments consist of the types of arguments that the judges themselves would make if discussing 
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the relevant policy issue. Judges might find more meaning in comments by legislators whose 
ideology and thinking patterns more closely approximate their own. On this theory, legislative 
history genuinely has the ability to persuade, albeit for reasons that may vary from one judge to 
another. 
 Political heuristic selective citation. Legislative history may serve as a heuristic device. 
Heuristics are simple, efficient rules of thumb that people use to make decisions, typically when 
facing complex problems or incomplete information.  A judge may give relatively great credence 
to legislative history from a legislator who shares the same party identification because of the 
values and policy expectations associated with that party identification.  On this theory, to a 
judge, a statute means what the judge’s fellow partisan in Congress says it means.  Recent 
theories of coherence-based reasoning presume a connectionist architecture of mental 
representations where complex decision tasks contain a myriad of variables that point in more 
than one direction and lack coherence. This theory posits that “the mind shuns cognitively 
complex and difficult decision tasks by reconstructing them into easy ones, yielding strong, 
confident conclusions” (Simon 2004). Coherence effects interact with the decision-maker's 
preexisting attitudes, particularly those embedded in the person’s enduring value system. (Simon 
2004, pp. 541-542)  Put differently, judges rely on the political-orientation heuristic to help in the 
complex task of interpreting statutes.  On this theory then legislative history may genuinely 
persuade, albeit for reasons that vary from judge to judge and that might not survive more careful 
analysis. 
B. Analysis 
The challenge in distinguishing among these three reasons for selective citation is that 
each potentially applies to the ideology effect of the authoring judge, and the panel and hierarchy 
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contextual effects. An opinion author may invoke legislative history because the judge is results 
oriented, because the content of the legislative history may appeal to the judge, or because the 
legislative history has heuristic appeal to the judge. At the same time, however, an opinion 
author may invoke legislative history because the judge recognizes, consciously or 
subconsciously, that the citation will support some other judge’s preferred result, that the content 
of the legislative history may appeal to the other judge or judges, or because the legislative 
history is likely to have heuristic appeal to the other judge or judges.  
 Just because each of the theories potentially applies to all of the effects, however, does 
not mean that each of these theories unambiguously predicts the observed empirical results. In 
particular, the data may be inconsistent with results-oriented selective citation. Results-oriented 
selective citation should be expected to lead to the opinion author ideology effect to the extent 
that opinion authors are results oriented, and to the panel and hierarchy effects to the extent that 
the political orientations of other judges affect the opinion author’s own vote. As noted above, 
Sunstein et al. (2004, pp. 305) conclude that the political orientation of a judge has about the 
same effect on a judge’s vote as the political orientation of other judges. Assuming that to be 
correct, we should expect that the ideology effect to be of roughly comparable magnitude to the 
panel and hierarchy effects.  
That prediction, however, is not consistent with the data. Consider in particular Table 4, 
reporting the probit analysis for the subset of three-judge panels that represent majority opinions. 
We have already noted that the variable representing the percentage of Republicans on the circuit 
panel is significant while the variable representing the ideology of the opinion author is not. The 
magnitudes of the coefficients, moreover, are also different by an order of magnitude.10  Thus, at 
                                                 
10
 We used a Chi-square test to assess the null hypothesis that the coefficients were equal, and we were able to reject 
that hypothesis (p = 0.016). 
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least for majority circuit opinions, we can conclude that the identity of other judges on the panel 
has a greater impact on citation of legislative history than the identity of the opinion author. The 
probit analysis of district judges (Table 2) and the probit analysis of all circuit court panel 
decisions (Table 3) also reveal coefficients of vastly different magnitudes, though in these cases 
the differences were statistically insignificant (p = 0.0557 and 0.1388, respectively). 
Though our conclusion on this point must be tentative, the analysis does not appear 
consistent with the hypothesis that result-oriented selective citation is the sole reason for 
selective citation. It appears that citations to legislative history have much more to do with the 
presumed ideologies of other judges than with the presumed ideology of the authoring judges, 
and it is difficult to square this observation with results-oriented selective citation. 
The other two theories of selective citation, however, are potentially compatible with this 
observation. It may be that opinion authors themselves do not tend to find legislative history 
consistent with their own political affiliation to be particularly persuasive, but anticipate that 
legislative history consistent with the political affiliation of other judges on a panel or potential 
reviewing judges will be persuasive to those judges. There are two possible explanations for this. 
First, judges may simply overestimate the extent to which other judges’ ideological leanings will 
lead those judges to find certain arguments particularly persuasive. Second, a judge writing an 
opinion might spend more time thinking through an issue than the judge expects either 
colleagues on a panel or reviewing judges to spend before those judges reach the decisions that 
they will reach. As a result, opinion authors expect legislative history to make at least a 
significant first impression on other judges, even when the legislative history might appear less 
probative on closer analysis. This theory is particularly consistent with political heuristic 
selective citation. 
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V. Conclusion 
 
This study differs from past judicial politics studies in quantifying the reasoning within 
judicial opinions in situations in which the reasoning will have no direct legal effect on the 
parties in a case. We have found evidence of panel and hierarchy effects in citation to legislative 
history, effects that appear related to the political-ideological identification of judges who review 
or are co-members on a panel of the authoring judge. Specifically, we find that the higher the 
proportion of Republicans in the reviewing court or sitting on the same three-judge panel, the 
higher proportion of legislative history cites will be to Republican legislators. Although we 
cannot conclusively identify causality, the pattern of the data appears most consistent with the 
theory that judges do in fact attempt to persuade one another. 
 There are at least three possible directions for further research. First, other forms of 
judicial reasoning are potentially subject to quantification. In particular, precedents might be 
quantified based on the presumed ideology of the courts that initially enacted those precedents. 
Second, consideration of the briefs filed in particular cases might further illuminate judges’ 
reasoning. For example, it would be possible to test whether citations to sources not cited in 
briefs are particularly likely to be associated with judges’ presumed ideologies. Third, 
quantitative analysis of reasoning might be combined with quantitative analysis of whether the 
results in cases were liberal or conservative. Data on whether particular decisions reached a 
liberal or conservative result might allow for clearer conclusions about the reasons for selective 
citation. 
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